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ABSTRACT 
The topic of the thesis ~s the attempt made by empiricist 
philosophers, notably Carnap and Reichenbach, to "reduce" time, or 
temporal order, to some physically observable feature of the universe 
such as causal chains or entropy increases in closed systems. 'Ihis was 
not merely an attempt to find some physical counterpart to our subjective 
sense of time order but an attempt to eliminate completely any dependence, 
in the scientific context, on this subjective sense. The thesis examines 
the validity of this reduction and attempts to show why, both in the 
light of scientific evidence and in view of some more general philosophical 
or epistemological considerations, the empiricist attempt has failed. 
Reductionism, as explained in the first chapter, is basically 
the thesis that certain types of concepts, the higher-level concepts 
of scientific theory, subjective or allegedly a priori concepts, are 
all defineable in a language which is descriptive of observable physical 
features of the world. The causal theory of time, as explained and 
examined in the second and third chapter, is reductionist in as much as 
in this theory, the temporal order is explained and defined in terms of 
an independently ascertainable relation among physical events, the causal 
relation. I try to show that the definition is circular and suffers from 
certain other weaknesses due to the notion of causality assumed in the 
theory. The thermodynamical definition of time order in terms of entropy 
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increases in observable closed systems is shown, in chapter four, to 
be paradoxical and based on some very questionable cosmological 
assumptions. In the fifth and concluding chapter I suggest an alter-
native to the reductionist conceptualization of science in which the 
relation of dependence or presupposition among scientific concepts and 
theories is no longer unidirectional and in which the relation between 
theoretical and observational language is much more complex and flexible. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTORY 
l.l. Introduction 
The passage of time is something familiar to all of us. Time, 
as a phenomenon worthy of philosophical concern_, has always been a source 
of puzzlement, perplexity and paradox. Since the days of Aristotle there 
has been no shortage of answers to the question later asked by Augustine, 
"What, then, is time?". For Aristotle time was not a substantial entity 
capable of exist~ng separately from other things and he defined it as the 
"number of movement in respect of 'before' and 'after'". Time, for 
Aristotle, was an attribute of motion and motion was an attribute of 
substance. 
For Au6~stine time was something essentially subjective or 
psychological. There is only a "present of things past, memory; present 
of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation". For 
Kant, time was also, in a sense, subjective, for it was the form of 
inner sense, the mold or structure into which our experience of phenomena 
must fit and, other than being a form of experience, time had no objective 
existence. 
The present thesis will concern itself with a more modern 
philosophical attempt to provide an answer to the problem of time. 
This answer I refer to as "reductionism" or the "reductionist thesis". 
It is the attempt made by empiricist philosophers, notably Carnap and 
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Reichenbach, to "reduce" time or temporal order to sorre observable 
feature of the universe, such as causal chains or entropy increase in 
closed systems, as these features are expressed in the lawlike statements 
of empirical science. Such a "reduction" or "definition" aims at 
eliminating the "reystery" from the notion of time, and at eliminating, 
in the scientific context, any dependence on temporal knowledge which 
may be termed, in some sense, "subjective" or "a priori". 
The present chapter contains, other than an explication of 
terminology, a brief statement of the reductionist thesis. The following 
chapter presents Carnap's early Kantian-style approach to the problem of 
time as found in "Der Raum". The causal theory is introduced and also 
Carnap 's axiom system for space-time topology based on causal chains. 
Chapter 'Three contains a critique of the causal theory, both from the 
point of view of internal difficulties and from the point of view of the 
notion of causality assumed in the theory. Chapter Four concerns itself 
with the thermodynamical approach to time order, the classical entropy 
law, Boltzmann's statistical analysis, Eddington and "time's arrow", 
and the Reichenbach "branch hypothesis". The Eddington and Reichenbach 
proposals are criticized and rejected. The final chapter offers a 
general criticism of the reductionist attempt where I try to show that 
it is based on an unacceptable conceptualization of science and on a 
misunderstanding of the nature of scientific-theoretic terms in relation 
to the concepts of experience. 
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1.2. Explication of Concepts 
A series of events is temporally ordered when it is 
established for any two events of the series that one is earlier than 
the other> or, when this is not the case> under what conditions they 
are to be considered sirrn1ltaneous. The ordering relation is the 
relation earlier than> with it's converse> later than. 
The points on a straight line can be ordered by the asymmetric 
transitive relation "to the left of11 > with its' converse> "to the right 
of". However, the specification of the order "to the left of" involves 
reference to an external viewer and his particular perspective. The 
ordering relation "to the left of11 is therefore a conventional or 
extrinsic ordering relation. An order is intrinsic when it does not 
involve reference to an external viewer. The relation of "betweenness" 
for points on a straight line is intrinsic> in our sense> since it does 
not involve reference to entities outside the domain. Given the 
intrinsic "betweenness" relation a serial order can be introduced into 
the system by the establishment of the asymmetric relation "to the left 
of" between two arbitrarily chosen reference points. A serial order can 
thus be defined for the whole line but this serial order is extrinsic. 
The serial order of the system of real numbers with respect to the 
relation "smaller than" is intrinsic> for any two numbers> their 
ordering with respect to magnitude does not involve reference to the 
particular perspective of some observEror to any entities outside the 
domain. Similarly> once betweenness has been defined, one can choose 
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any two rererence states in time and extrinsically order this time 
serial by making one or these events ''earlier than11 the other through 
the assigrunent or suitable real numbers. But this time-order is merely 
extrinsic. Time order would be intrinsic ir there were some property, 
possessed by each or the total states or the world, which would derine 
a dyadic relation between every pair or states such that the class or 
states rorms an order with respect to this relation. Ir such a property 
existed the world would be temporally anisotropic. This property would 
allow us to determine an intrinsic dirrerence in direction between the 
relation and its converse. When we speak or the 11direction or time 11 
we rerer to this static directional dirrerence between the relation and 
its converse, between 11earlier11 and 'l]_ater''. It does not mean that time 
nrlows 11 in any privileged direction. When we speak or anisothropy or 
time we do not make any assertion about 11the 11 direction or time. 
1.3. A derinition or Time 
We all reel intuitively that there is a deep and rar-reaching 
dirrerence between past and future, earlier and later, which is more 
basic than the difrerence between lert and right. The asyrmnetric 
temporal order with respect to the relation "earlier than" is so much 
part or our immediate awareness of the world that it hardly seems to be 
in need of justification. However, all attempts to account ror the 
asymmetry of time in terms or the deeper physical reatures or the 
universe have met with insurmountable difficulties. Is there anything 
in nature which would enable us to 11define" temporal order, anything to 
which temporal order could be "reduced11 ? or must we rely solely, not 
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only in our practical, but also in our scientific endeavours, on our 
subjective sense of time order? To the former question many philosophers 
have given an affirmative answer. Eddington, for instance, found in the 
second law of the thermodynamics "the only law of nature which recognizes 
a distinction between past and future more profound than the difference 
of plus and minus "1 . The property of the total states of the world 
which, for Eddington, defined an intrinsically asyrrrrnetric temporal order 
was entropy, the measure of organization. 
"Without a mystic appeal to consciousness it is possible 
to find a direction of time on the four dimensional map by a 
study of organization".2 
Reichenbach, in his earlier writings, found the physical criterion for 
temporal order in an independently defined asymmetric causal relation. 
The temporal order was, in his system, "reduced" to the causal order. 
The causal theory of time received an elaborate logical refinement in 
the construction, by Reichenbach3 and Carnap, 4 of a relativistic topology 
of space and time. Carnap has shown, in three ways, that the topology 
of space is reducible to that of time and that the latter is reducible 
to the topology of causal chains . Carnap 's axiomatization does not, as 
1Eddington, A.S. The Nature of the Physical World, Cambridge: 
Univ. Press, 1929, p. 69. 
2Eddington, A.S. op. cit., p. 69. 
~eichenbach, H. Axiomatik der relativistischen Ra~Zeit Lehre, 
Braunschweig: F. Vieweg & Sons, 1924. 
4
carnap, R. Abriss der Logistik, Vienna: T. Springer; 1929. 
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such, commit him to the causal theory of time since the "causal 
relation'' is primitive in only one of his three versions. The third 
version, however, exhibits the space-time order as the expression of a 
causal order whose nature can be understood independently and in so 
doing he has established the deductive fertility and the explanatory 
capabilities of the theory. 
It is my purpose to examine, in this thesis, the epistemo-
logical viability of this thesis of the reducibility of the temporal 
order to some independently knowable features of the universe as these 
are formulated in known natural laws . 
l. 4 Time-order and Law: a nomological approach 
Two things are to be noticed, first of all, about this thesis 
of reducibility. Leaving for the moment, the notions of "definition" 
and 11reduction" unclear, it is to be noted that the physical feature 
of the universe to which temporal order is to be "reduced" or in terms 
of which it is to be "defined" rrust be knowable in such a way that this 
knowledge rrust, in no way, make use of or presuppose a prior knowledge 
of the temporal order. And~ secondly, this feature or property of the 
universe to which temporal order is reduced is known through the laws 
and equations of physical science. This second aspect we shall refer 
to as the "nomological" aspect of the reductionist thesis. This does 
not mean merely that the "time" in which these philosophers are 
interested is primarily or only "time" as understood in the context 
of a scientific theory even though this may be, for the most part, true. 
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We refer to the reduct~onist's explanation of time as nomological 
because of the use of the concept of natural law which i_t involves . 
A nomological explanation of temporal order would seek to demonstrate 
that the laws and equations of physical science provide us with an 
intrinsic criterion for the ordering of events with respect to the 
relation "earlier than". 'Ihis criterion would do three things: 
(1) it would provide time with a "direction", in the sense already 
explained; 
(2) it would provide us with a physical explanation of the ultimate 
difference between past and future; 
(3) it would enable us to determine, for any two events, and without 
recourse to our subjective impressions, which one was "earlier 
than" the other. 
I aim to show that the empiricist's attempt at reduction has 
failed, not only because of their own understanding or explication of 
the concept of natural law, but because of the laws and equations of 
science itself. In other words, as far as the known laws of nature are 
concerned, temporal order is isotropic; there is no intrinsic, i.e. 
observer--independent difference between past and future. This means, 
in particular, that all known physical laws would remain valid in a 
universe in which our temporal order were reversed, in a universe 
whose past and future are interchanged with ours. If time--order is 
isotropic, the natural laws with time variable tF in frame of reference 
F would remain valid in a frame of reference F1 with a new time 
reference tFl whereby for every event E it would be the case that 
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tFl = tF. In a universe in which the classical second law or 
thermodynamics, the law of entropy increase in a closed system, were 
to hold absolutely, time would not be isotropic since the principle 
of entropy increase would not be covariant under time reversal. In 
such a universe there would be an intrinsically derinable difrerence 
between earlier and later, past and future, and temporal order could be 
"defined" in terms of entropy. Thus there would be a physical counter-
part to our subjective sense of time order which would eliminate the 
need ror recourse to this subjective sense in the scientiric context. 
That, in our universe, as we know it through the laws and equations of" 
physical science, there is no such physical counterpart to our subjectively 
known temporal order, whose nature could be understood independently or 
prior knowledge of temporal order, is what I hope to show in what 
rollows. Positively, I hope to give an account of the epistemological 
status or our knowledge of temporal order and its implications for an 
empirical philosophy. 
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Chapter 'IWo 
CARNAP ON KNOWLEDGE OF TIME ORDER 
2.1. Time-order a topological concept 
Time order is a topological concept, independent of consider-
ations of metric. The topological properties of time are those which 
remain invariant in any transformation from one frame of reference to 
another. In "Der Raumn Carnap attempted to demonstrate the special 
significance of the topological properties of space and it is to be 
assumed that analogous considerations would apply to the topological 
properties of time. 
2.2. Carnap's theory of space 
Carnap first distinguishes between formal, visual (intuitive) 
and physical space. 
Formal space is a pure ntheory of relations" or "order theoryn. 
This formal theory is not concerned with what are normally called spatial 
constructions, e.g. triangles, circles, but with the meaningless termini 
of relations, which termini may represent practically any set of objects 
in so far as these objects exhibit relations that satisfy certain formal 
conditions. The basic concepts need have no determinate meaning 
(Begriffsbestimmung) since only the relations are important, only the 
logical form. The axioms establish certain relations among the basic 
concepts and the necessary theorems can be deduced logically from the 
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axioms without taking into account any possible meanings for the basic 
concepts. This relational theory establishes a formal structure which 
becomes the structure of space as we know it if, in place of the 
indeterminate, uninterpreted concepts we insert the usual spatial concepts 
of point, straight line, etc. This theory of formal space is an extension 
of the theory of relations. It's basic propositions are deduced from the 
basic laws of deductive logic and are completely independent of experience. 
They are, in the well known terminology, a priori but analytic. 
Physical space, on the other hand, is part of empirical knowledge. 
It is, in Kant ian terms, both synthetic and a posteriori. We perceive, 
in our experience of nature, certain relations, e.g. betweenness, 
nearness, which we call spatial. These are physico-spatial relations 
and the theory of physical space, which is part of empirical science, 
must determine which of, and to what extent, these relations hold among 
the objects of experience. 
Apart from formal and physical space there is also visual 
(intuitive) space(Anschauungsraum). "By visual space we understand that 
body of relations between what are usually called spatial constructions, 
i.e. lines, planes, etc. whose peculiarity we perceive through sensible 
perception or merely by representation (blosen Vorstellung). Here we 
are not concerned with the spatial facts of experience but with the 
'essence' of these constructions themselves". 1 The question here is not 
1 Carnap, R. Der Raum. Berlin: Reuter and Reichard; 1922. p. 6. 
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the psychological one of the origin of our spatia--visual constructions 
but the logical one concerning the foundation of our knowledge of such 
constructions. In particular this question, in the context of visual 
space, is restricted to the axioms or basic principles since all other 
propositions can be formally deduced from these. "Experience does not 
provide the justification for them; the axioms are ..... independent of 
the 'quantity of experience', i . e. knowledge of them does not, as in the 
case of a posteriori propositions, become ever more reliable through 
multiply repeated experience . For, as Husserl has shown, we are dealing 
here, not with facts, in the sense of empirically ascertained realities, 
but rather with the essence (eidos) of certain presentations whose special 
nature can be grasped in a single immediate experience" 2 
2.3. Topological properties of space 
We have called physical space a part of empirical science. 
The question, however, whether three or more given physical points lie 
in a straight line, cannot be answered from facts of observation alone, 
without some previously freely chosen rule or convention. We may choose 
to regard a light ray as straight. Or we may choose a definite rigid 
body and choose two points on it and lay down the measure for the 
distance between the two points. In relation to this metrical convention 
the question regarding the three points can be answered. 
One of the more general sections of the theory of visual space 
2 Carnap, R. Der Raum. Berlin: Reuter and Reichard; 1922. p. 22. 
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is the theory of topological visual space. The theory of topological 
visual space is a system constructed without the concepts of straightness 
and congruence. Corresponding to this we have the topological physical 
space, likewise constructed without the help of the conventionally 
determined metric. Only topological space can give us a unique repre-
sentation of the objects of experience. The projective and metrical 
space depend on a freely chosen conventional element and the type of 
spatial order in these systems will therefore not be unique. 
Here Car.nap makes another distinction, analogous to the 
matter-form distinction, but within the realm of form itself; the 
distinction between necessary and elective form. That part of the matter 
of experience which appears only in the necessary form is called the 
"fact-content" (Tatbestand) of experience. We can test a proposition 
to see if it is a "fact-content" proposition and, if so, what element 
is "fact-content", and which elective, by asking if the proposition 
remains valid for all possible forms of spatial reference. This would 
be the case if the content of the proposition were to remain invariant 
under all possible transformations, and, as we have seen, this is the 
case for topological propositions and only for those. An example of a 
".fact-content" proposition would be 
"This porcelain body is surrounded on all sides by this 
glass body". 
In the fact-content of experience we are given the three-dimensional 
topological space, not, however, the metrical space. The topological 
properties remain invariant under all possible metrical choices. 
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Topological space gives that which is common to all space systems and 
can be regarded as the "form" of space known through "essential 
intuition". 3 (Wesenserschauung). The spatial determinations contained 
in the fact-content of experience are necessary conditions of experience 
in the Kantian sense. Such spatial determinations are, as we have seen, 
the topological ones . Apart from the axioms of visual ( intuitive) space 
these topological proportions are the only synthetic a priori propositions 
of geometry. The topological properties of visual space are necessary and 
universally valid, are known a priori and are constitutive of experience. 4 
Summary: In an attempt to achieve some degree of clarity in 
the long standing dispute over the status of geometrical knowledge Carnap 
distinguishes between three different objects, formal, visual, and 
physical space. Formal space is an analytic order theory derived from 
the logical theory of relations. It is a priori in the way logic is. 
Physical space is the object of empirical science but only its topological 
properties are independent of conventional choices of metric. These 
properties form the fact-content of experience, remaining invariant in 
all spatial forms of reference. The axioms of visual (intuitive) space 
are a priori but among the derived propositions only the topological 
ones share this status. 
2.4. Topological properties of time 
The unit of time or the congruence of time intervals are 
3Ibid. p. 62. 
4Thid. p. 66. 
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metrical concepts. The time metric depends on the establishment of 
co-ordinative definitions for unit of time, uniformity, etc. When 
these have been established time measurement is possible. Time order, 
the ordering of two events with respect to the relation "earlier than", 
is a topological concept. The time order of two events is independent 
of whatever co-ordinati ve definitions are used for the time metric. An 
event A, earlier than event B in frame of reference F will be earlier 
than B in all other possible frames of reference. Time order is 
invariant under all transformtions. Remembering what was said about 
invariant spatial properties we could say that time order was part of 
the fact-content of experience. It is the "form" common to all temporal 
frames of reference. Time order would thus be a priori and constitutive 
of experience. The a priori character of our knowledge of time order 
is not explicitly stated by Carnap in "Der Raum" since he is dealing 
here exclusively with spatial problems. His general position, however, 
with regard to the special status of the topological properties of 
space, stated in terms of Husserl's "Wesenserschauung", lend plausibility 
to the above account of the epistemological status of the topological 
property of time-order. These epistemological considerations are also 
in agreement with the methods used in physics to the extent that in 
physics a space-time co-ordinate system, and thus a temporal order, 
belongs to the basic concepts. 
2.5. Empiricist account of temporal order 
In a later work on the foundations of logic and mathematics5 
5carnap, R. Foundations of Logic and Mathematics. International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Sclence, Vol. 1, no. 3. Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1939, p. 49. 
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Carnap denies the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge in general. 
In the atiiDsphere of the Vienna Circle his position "became more 
consistently one of empiricism". 6 He does not, however, give his reasons 
for no longer regarding the topological properties of space (or time) as 
having a special epistemological status. The general empiricist attitude 
to the intuitive experience of time-order is reflected in the following 
statement of Reichenbach: 
"All our so-called a priori judgements are determined by 
primitive experiences, the physics of everyday life, to a much 
higher degree than we think. . • . . we shall therefore use the 
distinction "time -as experience" and "physical time" only as a 
temporary aid which leads to a deeper scientific insight into 
the concept of time; we shall correct the intuitive experience 
of time accordingly. "7 
Time-order, according to this view, is no longer constitutive of experience. 
It must be possible then, to find some property of the physical world, 
the nature of which can be known without presupposing a prior knowledge 
of time order, in such a way that this property could then provide a 
criterion for determining time order. Such a criterion was found in the 
causal relation. This "causal theory of time" had already occupied an 
important place in the philosophy of Leibniz and Kant. In this century 
it was developed and refined in the work of K. Lewin, 8 
6
schilpp, P.A. ed. The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap, Open 
Court, 1963. p. 957. 
7 Reichenbach, H. Philosophy of Space and Time, Dover 
Publications, Inc.; 1958. p. 113. 
8Lewin, K. Die Zeitliche Geneseordnung. Zeitschrift ~~ 
Physik, Vol. XIII, 1923. 
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H. Reichenbach, 9 R. Carnap10 and H. Mehlberg, 11 . 'Ihe causal theory 
received great impetus from EinsteinS development of relativity theory, 
especially from his criticism of simultaneity. 'Ihe Lorentz transfor-
mations, which express Einsteins special theory of relativity, permit 
the reversal of time order of certain events, namely, of those which 
cannot be connected by causal chains. Time order, it was therefore, argued, 
could not be more than causal order. Time-order no longer retained its 
a priori status but was, in the words of Reichenbach, "reducible to 
causal order". 12 'Jhe deductive fertility of this theory was greatly 
enhanced by the development, by Reichenbach and Carnap, of a relativistic 
topology of space and time, as was already mentioned. In this system the 
relation of cause--effect (the causal--or signal--relation) was assumed 
as a primitive term and it was shown that temporal order, and even 
spatial order, could be reduced to this primitive relation. Carnap 
offers three versions of an axiom--system for space-time topology. In 
9Reichenbach, H. Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre. 
Braunschweig: F. Vieweg and Sons; 1924. 
10 Carnap, R. Abriss der Logistik, Vienna: T. Springer; 1929. 
1~ehlberg, H. Essai sur la theorie causale du Temps. Studia 
Philosophica, Vol. I, 1935 and Vol. II, 1937. 
12Reichenbach, H. 'Ihe Direction of Time, Berkeley: University 
of California Press; 1956. 
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only one of them is the causal relation assumed as primitive, repre-
sented by the single primitive sign of the system, S, standing for 
"signal--relation". Every topological property of space, as well as 
time, can be expressed as a property of the signal relation. The axiom 
system is based on the conception of space and time found in Einstein's 
theory of relativity. The assumed causal relation is asymnetric, 
transitive and dense. Since, in the causal theory, the time relation 
is defined in terms of a causal relation which can be determined 
independently, it must be demonstrated that an understanding of the 
asymmetric causal relation must be possible without the necessity of a 
prior understanding of time order. In the next chapter I will critically 
examine the causal theory and attempt to show that the causal relation 
alone is not sufficient to define an asymnetric time order. The causal 
theory put forward in Carnap's axiomatization is beset by a circularity 
in that knowledge of the asymmetric causal relation presupposes prior 
knowledge of the temporal order which it seeks to define. 
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Chapter Three 
CRITIQUE OF THE CAUSAL THEORY 
3 .l. Temporal symmetry of causal laws 
Despite the philosophic demand for clarity and scientific 
exactness made by the proponents of the causal theory, there still 
remains a great deal of uncertainty as to the exact sense of the 
question which the causal theory is supposed to answer. According to 
l Reichenbach's early attempt the problem is one of providing a 
"co-ordinative definition" for time-order. Co-ordinative definitions, 
according to the usual interpretation2, are rules of correspondence 
between theoretical and observational terms. They are sometimes called 
"operational rules" or "operational definitions"3. There is a sense 
in which our subjective impression of temporal succession is itself 
such a rule. Another rule referrer to the use of a clock. Understood 
in this way the rule provided by the causal theory would, in certain 
important cases, take the place of those customary rules based on 
~eichenbach, H. The Philosophy of Space and Time, S£· cit. 
p. 123. 
2 Hempel, C. Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York; 
The Free Press, 1965. p. 184. 
3sridgman, P. W. The Logic of Modern Physics, New York; 
Macmillan, 1927. p. 5. 
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subjective impression on the use of clock. This seems to be the sense 
of Reichenbach's thesis: 
"With respect to two events that are sufficiently separated 
in time, the observer has an immediate experience of time order, 
and he uses this experience on the basis for the ordering of the 
events. However, ..... we shall not refer to the subjective 
expression of time order. . . . . we must therefore establish a 
different criterion. Such a criterion is found in the causal 
relation. If E2 is the effect of E1 , then E2 is called later 
than E1 · r:Ihis is the topological co-ordinati ve definition of 
time order."3a 
r:Ihe important aspect of such a rule is that it is not meant to hold 
without exceptions. It is not an explicit definition and may be regarded 
as only a criterion. In this sense also Reichenbach, in his posthwnously 
published book "r:Ihe Direction of Time", speaks of the "explication" of 
the concept of time, and explication "which can never be proved to be 
strictly correct". "We can merely require that an explication be 
adequate, that is, that the explicans correspond, at least qualitatively, 
to the usage of the term in conversational language, and that if the 
explicans is put into the place of the explicandum, most sentences of 
conversational language do not change their truth value. "4 r:Ihe purpose 
of such explication is of course precision and the elimination of 
vagueness. It is very difficult then to understand how Reichenbach, 
immediately,afterwards, can formulate the much stro~ger thesis that time 
order is no more than causal order, that "if time order were more than 
3~eichenbach, H. r:Ihe Philosophy of Space and Time, op. cit. 
p. 136. 
4Reichenbach, H. The Direction of Time, op. cit. p. 24. 
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causal order the Lorentz transformations and Einstein's relativity could 
not be accepted."5 In fact those who reject this version of the causal 
theory of time, who think that time order has a meaning independent of 
causal order, are forced to deny physical significance to the theory of 
relativity. The honesty of such a statement becomes even more question-
able in view of the fact that in this book Reichenbach has given up 
his earlier attempt to define time order in terms of the causal relation 
alone and provides a schematization based on reversible processes, which 
is in fact a new criterion and a much more restricted one than that of 
the causal relation. My interpretation of the problem as given in 
Ch. I. is, in agreement with Mehlberg's, 6 a nomological one. This is the 
problem of accounting for the asymmetry of temporal order on the basis 
of natural laws, i.e. whether natural laws provide the basis or 
justification for an intrinsic (observer independent) distinction between 
past and future, earlier and later, or whether they can be distinguished 
only in relation to an individual frame of reference or an individual 
observer. This interpretation preserves the two initial aims common to 
all such approaches to the problem of time. I consider these two fundamental 
aims to be (l) that the solution to the philosophical problem of time 
is to be found in the laws and equations of mathematical physics. 
5Ibid.' p. 25. 
6Mehlberg, H. Physical Laws and Time's Arrow, in Feig1, 
Maxwell Current Issues In Philosophy Of Science, New York, 1961, p. 109. 
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(2) that the attempt must be made to dispense entirely with the need 
for recourse to the deliverances of our psychological or subjective 
sense of temporal order. "The problem of time cannot be solved by an 
appeal to intuitive knowledge."7 
Of course the problem which immediately presents itself for 
the causal theory, in whatever way it may be formulated, is that of 
providing a criterion for determining an asymmetric causal relation 
which does not make tacit or illicit use of our knowledge of temporal 
order. Do the laws of nature provide us with a causal relation which 
is intrinsically asymmetric or "directed"? The laws of physics state 
functional relationships between certain physical quantities, and they 
assert that if certain physical quantities have a certain value, another 
quantity has a determined value. Such laws do not provide us with an 
asymmetric causal order because of the convertibility of functions. The 
law of Boyle and Mariotte for perfect gases provides such an example. 
The statement of the law is 
p . v = R. T. M/m. 
where pressure (p) volume (v) molecular weig..'lt(m) mass (M) and temperature 
(T) are in a functional relationship which holds for all changes in the 
values of the quantities, but which does not tell us which change is 
the cause of another, in the sense that it comes first. This relation is 
one of causal connection and is systemetrical. We know, of course, which 
7Reichenbach, H. The Direction of Time, op. cit. p. 16. 
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change comes first when we experiment with gas but this knowledge 
depends on our subjective experience of temporal succession and cannot 
be derived from the law alone. Other laws which establish causal 
relations are the laws of classical mechanics, including relativity 
theory. These laws describe physical processes and these mechanical 
processes are, as is known, reversible, that is, the laws remain 
co-variant under time reversal. They thus fail to provide us with a 
physical basis for temporal asymmetry since, on the basis of these laws 
alone there is no intrinsic difference between the process and its reverse. 
The differential equations expressing the laws of mechanics are of the 
second order involving time as an independent variable. If f(t) is a 
solution of such an equation then f(-t) is likewise a solution. If p is 
the position vector of a particle and v its velocity, the property of 
time symmetry or covariance under time reversal means that if the 
equations of motion lead in a time interval t from a state p1v1 to a state 
p2v2 then in the same interval they also lead from p2 - v2 to p1 - v1 . 
In a world containing only reversible processes such as the worlds of 
Newtonian mechanics and of the Lorentz--transformations of special 
relativity a serial time could not be derived from the laws of nature 
alone but could be only introduced extrinsically, that is, as depend-
ent on our subjective impression of temporal direction. In such a world 
temporal order would be more than causal order and could not be reduced 
to the latter because of the indispensibility of our intuitively based 
knowledge of time-order. Whether the situation is essentially different 
from the point of view of laws describing other than mechanical processes 
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is what we must determine later. The conclusion we have reached so 
far is that we cannot provide a criterion for establishing an asymmetry 
in the causal laws describing mechanical processes which is independent 
of previous intuitive temporal lmowledge. Reichenbach's early attempt 
to establish the mark-principle as such a criterion has been sufficiently 
criticized by Grunbaum, Mehlberg and others and, in any case, Reichenbach 
himself abandoned it in his later work. A philosophically much more 
serious difficulty encountered by the causal theory is connected with 
the problem of a satisfactory explication of the concept of possibility. 
Two events are simultaneous, according to Einstein's definition of 
special relativity, if there is no possibility of a causal connection 
between them. If S is the primitive causal (signal) relation, two events 
a and b are simultaneous if neither aS b nor b S a could be the case. 
The physical basis for this in relativity theory is, of course, the limit-
ing character of the velocity of light. Similarly, to sey that event a 
is "before" event b it is not necessary the aS b be the case, only that 
a S b should be possible. In the Einstein Minkowsky scheme a is before 
b if a is situated somewhere in the "prior cone" of b. (fig. a). 
future 
past 
A .a c 
fig. (a) 
In fig. (a) point-events b and d can be regarded as simultaneous. 
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All point events in the cone c1 BC could be called simultaneous with 
b in cone A 'BA because of the impossibility of establishing a causal 
connection between them and b. Similarly a !I and all point events in 
the cone ABC!! the "prior cone", are "before" .c. Some of these points 
events may actually be causally connected with C but this is not 
necessary in order for them to qualify as being before .C. The events 
in cone A1 BC1 are after b because of the causal connectibility of b 
and any event C in the cone A1 BC1 . If temporal order is to be reduced 
to causal connectibility then, to avoid circularity, physical possibility 
must be definable or understood in such a way as not to presuppose the 
ordinal concept of time. This ordinal concept of time enters into the 
laws which tell us which physical processes are possible. It is no way 
out of this difficulty to arbitrarily stipulate!! as Mehlberg8 does, that 
any two events which can be possibly connected are to be regarded as 
actually connected. Given a class of simultaneous events and an event 
outside this class Mehlberg simply postulates that between this event 
and some event of the class there must be an actual causal connection. 
Such a hypothesis avoids the difficulty but does nothing to solve it. 
In any case it is an insufficiently grounded ad hoc assumption. Neither 
Reichenbach nor Carnap take account of this problem in their axiomatizations. 
3.2. The Notion of Causality assumed in the theory 
The first thing to be noticed about the notion of causality 
~hlberg, H. La theorie causale du ten:ps, .22..· cit. I, 
pp. 165-166, 240-241. II pp. 145-146, 169-172. 
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asswned in the causal theory is that it is an episteiiDlogical rather 
than an ontological category. By epistemological, in this sense, I 
mean concerned with our experience and knowledge of' things rather than 
with some objective characteristic of' the things themselves. If' 
causality were the latter it would have ontological status. 
This conception of' causality is f'ound in the philosophy of' 
Locke, Berkeley, Hwne and Kant. Locke, f'or instance, speaks of' 
causality in the f'ollowing way: 
"In the notice that our senses take of' the constant 
vicissitudes of' things we cannot but observe that several 
particulars, both qualities and substances, begin to exist, 
and that they receive this their existence f'rom the due 
application and operation of' some other being. From this 
observation we get our ideas of' cause and ef'f'ect. That 
which produces any simple or complex idea we denote by the 
general name, cause, and that which is produced, ef'f'ect. 
Thus, f'inding that in that substance which we call wax, 
f'luidity, which is a simple idea that was not in it bef'ore, 
is constantly produced by the application of' a certain degree 
of' heat we call the simple idea of' heat, in relation to 
f'luidity in wax, the cause of' it, and f'luidity the ef'f'ect, .... 
For to have the idea of' cause and ef'f'ect it suf'f'ices to 
consider any simple idea or substance, as beginning to exist, 
by the operation of' some other, without knowing the manner 
of' that operation. "9 
Berkeley, likewise, emphasized the subjective nature of' causality: 
" .... we actually perceive, by the aid of' our senses 
nothing except the ef'f'ects or sensible qualities and 
corporeal things entirely passive . . . . real ef'f'icient 
causes of' the motion and existence of' bodies or of' 
corporeal things in no way belongs to mechanics or 
experiment . "10 
9Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book 2, 
Ch. XXVI. 
10Berkeley, De Motu, section 40-41. 
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In the same manner Kant was later to argue that for human experience 
to be of the kind that it in fact is there must be~ in addition to 
the empirical data provided by the senses~ certain formal or structural 
elements which organize the manifold of sense into the patterns which 
comprise our actual experience. We experience the material world 
as consisting of material objects possessing qualities and involved 
in causal processes. The concept of substance or of thinghood and 
cause are not and could not be part of what is empirically received~ 
but are the mind's contribution to experience; they are the formal as 
opposed to the material features of experience. Thus~ according to 
Kant, the causal law does not apply to things but to experience alone. 
The relation between cause and effect is neither something observable 
nor something extracted from experience nor a product of subjective 
habit and association but rather a relation, into which the given of 
experience must enter~ in order to make objective experience possible. 
Causality is thus the order of the given of perception according to a 
uniting principle (Einheitsprinzip) of thought, an application of the 
thought relation, reason and consequence~ (Grund und Folge) to the 
material of perception. But although Locke had regarded causation as 
a connection, the distinctive mark of which was production, Hume and 
others following him have held that causality is only a relation; one 
relating experiences rather than things in the world. Hume rejects 
the concept of production as part of the notion of causality since it 
would not be empirically verifiable that a cause produces it's effect, 
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but only that the event called cause is invariably associated with 
or followed by the event called effect. Causation is, then, according 
to this view, a component of experience rather than an objective form 
of interdependence obtaining among happenings in nature. The statement 
of a causal relation, therefore, between a class of events C and 
another class of events E does not involve any assertion about a unique 
bond or necessary connection between C and E. The causal law, "if 
C then always E" states no more than that there is, in Burne's words, 
a "constant union betwix the cause and effect" . 11 The statement, "if 
C then always E" is a universal conditional statement expressing the 
constant conjunction of two kinds of terms. This constant conjunction 
is not an ontological connection but an external association, an 
invariable coincidence. The statement contains three notions associated 
with causality; the conditionalness peculiar to lawfulness, the 
existential priority of the cause over the effect, and the lack of 
exception, but it makes no assertion about any active or productive 
nature that causal agents are supposed to possess and nothing about the 
process out of which E emerges. The causal relation then becomes a 
statement of an exceptionless repetition. According to Ayer "every 
general proposition of the form 'C causes E' is equivalent to a 
proposition of the form 'whenever C then E' where the symbol 'wherever' 
11Hurne, Treatise, Book I, part III, section XV. 
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must be taken to refer, not to a finite number of actual instances of 
C, but to the infinite number of possible instances."12 Likewise, for 
Reichenbach, causality is defined as a relation, belonging to the same 
category as statements like "B lies between A and C" and not as a 
connection. 
"To say that an electric current causes a deflection 
of the magnetic needle means that whenever there is an 
electric current there is always a deflection of the magnetic 
needle. The addition in terms of 'always' distinguishes 
the causal law from a chance coincidence. It once happened 
that while the screen of a motion picture theatre showed the 
blasting of lumber, a slight earthquake shook the theatre. 
The spectators had a momentary feeling that the explosion 
on the screen caused the shaking of the theatre. When we 
refuse to accept this interpretation, we refer to the fact 
that the observed coincidence was not repeatable. 
Since repetition is all that distinguishes a causal 
law from a mere coincidence, the meaning of causal relation 
consists in the statement of an exceptionless repetition -
it is unnecessary to assume that it means more. The idea 
that a cause is connected with its effect by a sort of 
hidden string, that the effect is forced to follow the cause, 
is anthropomorphic in its origin and is dispensable; if -
then - always is all that is meant by a causal relation. If 
the theatre would always shake when an explosion is visible 
on the screen, then there would be a causal relationship. "13 
But the notion of exceptionless repetition is really no 
more than the notion of lawfulness. But laws, in the impirical 
tradition, are not defined in ontological terms of the immanent 
12 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, London; Victor Gollanez, 
Ltd., 1936. p. 55. 
l3Reichenbach, H. The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, 
Berkeley: University of California Press; 1951. p. 157-58. 
29 
patterns of being and becoming but in the episterrological terms of 
conceptual constructions. Thus Braithwaite defines laws in the 
following way: ''What we call the laws of nature are conceptual devices 
by which we organize our empirical knowledge and predict the future" . 14 
This is_, of course, in line with the Kantian tradition. Carnap sees 
in the laws of nature just "assertions with a general content" and Mach 
says that a law of nature is nothing but "a rule for displaying all 
single predictions. "15 A law then is a statement within some scientific 
theory. The identification of law with rule of procedure made by Mach 
leads readily to another identification, namely, that of causality 
with lawfulness. Thus Mach writes, again: 
"The business of physical science is the reconstruction 
of facts in thought, or the abstract quantitative expression 
of facts. The rules which we form for these reconstructions 
are the laws of nature. In the conviction that such rules 
are possible lies the law of causality."l6 
The principle of causality is therefore no more than the assumptions of 
the lawfulness of all natural phenomena. Russell gave the following 
definition: 
"By a causal law I mean any general statement in virtue 
of which it is possible to infer the existence of one thing 17 
or event from the existence of another or of a number of others." 
14Braithwaite, R.B. Scientific Explanation, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1953, p. 339. 
1~ach, E. The Science of Mechanics, 1883. Reprinted in 
La Salle: Open Court Publishing Co.; 1902. p. 439. 
16Ibl. d. 605 p. . 
l7Russell, B. Our Knowledge of the External World, London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1926, p. 216. 
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The causal connection then, which plays such a central role in the 
causal theory of time, is to be found in a lawlike statement of 
scientific theory, which statement expresses a relation between two 
terms, a relation of constant conjunction. 
We have seen how the concept of causal connection assumed 
in the causal theory contains the three notions of conditionality, 
temporal priority of cause over effect, and regularity or constant 
conjunction. In order to reduce temporal to causal order we must first 
drop the notions of temporal priority from the concept of causality. 
Thus we are left with the notion of regularity. By the statement "If 
C then always E" only a constant relation between two terms is meant, 
two terms that are "conjoined but not connected" (Hume) and of which, 
in this case, one cannot say which of them is temporally prior to the 
other. C and E are just regularly conjoined. Obviously there is 
nothing in this relation of constant conjunction which would make it 
intrinsically asymmetrical. This seems to me to be the main reason 
why the causal theory has failed to provide an independent criterion 
for temporal order. A concept of causality which would include, in 
addition to the notion of regularity, the notions of productivity or 
activity of the causal agent and the notion of the process out of which 
E emerges would be in a better position to provide us, it seems, with 
some physical criterion for a direction in the causal and thus in the 
temporal process. The causal law concept assumed in the causal theory 
cannot say that a given entity (or a change in it) is produced by 
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another entity (or change) since, according to this theory, we cannot 
give an account of' this production. As long as causality is identified 
with regularity then it cannot provide us with an independent criterion 
for temporal order and the empiricist exclusion of' those other notions 
f'rom the concept of' causation has made the task of' reduction an 
impossible one. 
This account of' causality which I have given is not meant 
to imply that the empiricist conception of' causality is not an 
adequate one or that an adequate account of' causality must also 
include the notions of' productive agent or productive process. It 
was merely intended to show that the exclusion of' these latter notions 
f'rom the account of' causality and its reduction to regularity makes 
impossible the empiricist attempt at reducing temporal order to an 
independently defined asymmetric causal relation. 
Reichenbach had begun with the Kantian statement: El shall 
be called earlier than E2 when El is a cause of' E2. But here he 
separated himself' f'rom Kant. Kant had presupposed the experienced 
tirre order in order to be able to define when El should be called a 
cause of' E2. Reichenbach ma.de the attempt to go forward without the 
Kantian assumption. El should be called a cause of' E2 if' a variation 
of' El is always accompanied by a variation of' E2, but not vice versa. 
He wished thereby to establish the asymmetry and, at the same tirre, 
the irreversibility of' the causal relation. This was very sharply 
criticized by H. Bergmann who showed that Reichenbach's variation-method 
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did not even produce the desired asymmetry. Reichenbach, in a later 
work, states his position as follows: 
"When we look at some simple cases of the causal relation 
we find that there are natural processes which show very 
clearly the difference between cause and effect. Mixing 
processes and such processes as go from an ordered to an 
unordered state are of this type. The physicists call them 
irreversible processes .... we can mix coffee and cream but 
we can't unmix them. It is a basic property of the world in 
which we live that the ca~al relation produces serially 
ordered physical events."lts 
But if one were to ask "when is El the cause of E2?" then one would ask 
in vain. Also, temporal order is now defined by rreans of increase of 
entropy in irreversible processes. If this is at all consistent with 
his previous definition by rreans of causal signals then the transmission 
of the signal from P 1 to P 2 must be assumed to be an irreversible process. 
But, in this case, it is the irreversible processes that are the 
foundation of the temporal order and it is not possible, in the context 
of Relativity Theory, to define a temporal order. For irreversible 
processes are as little evident in Relativity Theory as they are in 
rrechanics. Thus a relativistic topology of space and time based on the 
causal relation is not possible. Apart from the difficulties peculiar to 
the variation-method the main cause of this failure seems to be the 
restricted notion of causality which is operative in the causal theory. 
The next chaper will be concerned with the attempted definition of time 
in terms of irreversible processes. 
1%eichenbach, The Direction of Time, op. cit. p. 24. 
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Chapter Four 
TIME ORDER IN THERMODYNAMICS 
4.1. The Second Law 
The impossibility of constructing an engine which, with no 
other outstanding changes, will convert a given amount of heat completely 
into mechanical work is a fundamental law of Thermodynamics. The first 
law is the statement of the principle of the conservation of energy, and 
it states that in all changes there exists a certain quantity, called 
energy, which retains a constant value. The second law states that 
there is another quantity, called entropy, which in some char~es 
remains constant, but in other changes increases, whereas it is 
impossible that this quantity should ever decrease. Entropy can be 
created at will andthereis an increase of intropy in every natural 
process, if all systems taking part in the process are considered. 
This law of thermodynamics was formulated by Clausius (1850) and Thomson 
(1851) and in terms of thermodynamical parameters such as volume, 
specific heat, absolute temperature, it makes possible the mathematical 
expression of a direction controlling the course of physical occurrences. 
As formulated by Clausius the second law required that "the entropy of 
the world keeps increasing." Later on the principle was reformulated 
so as to imply that the constancy of the increase of entropy applied 
to observable "closed" systems, that is, systems exchanging a 
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negligible amount of' energy with their surroundings, rather than to a 
single unobservable entity called "the world." The simple example of' 
the mixing of' substances at different temperatures, or the flow of' heat 
f'rom a higher to a lower temperature, is illustrative of' all such natural 
processes. When all of' the entropy changes in the process are summed 
up, the increases in entropy are always greater than the decreases . 
In the special case of a quasistatic process the increases and decreases 
are equal. In other words, no process is possible in which the entropy 
decreases. This fundamental law of' nature , as formulated by Clausius, 
we ref'er to as the phenomenological second law of thermodynamics or 
as the classical entropy principle. What is the significance of the 
increase of' entropy that accompanies every natural process? The answer, 
or one f'orm of' the answer, is that it represents the extent to which 
the Universe "runs down" in that process . Consider the example of the 
mixing of' the hot and cold water. We might have used the hot and cold 
water as the high and low temperature reservoirs of' a heat engine, and 
in the course of removing heat from the hot water and giving heat to 
the cold water we could have obtained some mechanical work. But once 
the hot and cold water have been mixed and have come to a uniform 
temperature, this opportunity of converting heat to mechanical work is 
lost, and, moreover, it is lost irretrievably. The lukewarm water will 
never, according to the phenomenological law, unrnix itself' and separate 
into a hotter and colder portion. Of course, there is no decrease in 
energy when the hot and cold water are mixed, but there has been a 
decrease in the availibility, or an increase in the unavailibility of 
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the energy, in the sense that a certain amount of energy is no longer 
available for conversion into mechanical work. Hence, when entropy 
increases, energy becomes more unavailable, and we say that the Universe 
has "run downn to that extent. 
The tendency of all natural processes such as heat flow, 
mixing, diffusion, etc., is, according to this interpretation, to 
bring about a uniformity of temperature, pressure, composition, etc., 
at all points. One may visualize a distant future in which, as a 
consequence of these processes, the entire Universe has attained a state 
of uniformity throughout. When and if such a state is reached, although 
there would have been no change in the energy of the universe, all 
physical, chemical and biological processes would have to cease. This 
goal toward which we appear headed has been described as the "heat 
death" of the universe . Thus, according to the second law of thermo-
dynamics, the universe is constantly moving in the direction of ever 
increasing entropy. It is impossible that it should ever move in the 
direction of decreasing entropy, that is, in the direction of ever 
increasing order. Entropy is the increase of the random element in the 
universe and the universality and absoluteness of this increase of 
entropy offers an apparently dependable and, it seemed, exclusive 
indication of a physical counterpart to our subjective sense of the 
passage of time in the direction from earlier to later states. If the 
universe as a whole possesses at every moment a specific entropy, this 
value is subject to the general law of entropy increase; this means that, 
36 
according to the classical principle~ the universe progresses toward 
more and more equalized states. 'Ihe direction of the increase is the 
direction of positive time. 
The second law of thermodynamics states that the entropy 
increases in a closed system as long as any processes are going on 
within it~ i.e. as long as a state of equilibrium has not been reached. 
'Ihis law applies to a system only as long as the system is closed. 
Assume we have a container with a partition in the middle. On one 
side of the partition is gas and the other side has been evacuated. 
We then remove the partition. 'Ihe system is now a closed system. 
Immediately the gas flows into the vacuum from one side of the container 
to the other and entropy increases. We could restore order~ i.e. cause 
a decrease of entropy~ only by interfering with the system. But then 
it is no longer a closed system. 
Obviously the laws describing such processes are~ according 
to the classical principle, not covariant under time reversal. 'Ihe 
process is an irreversible process and since it is irreversible it is 
unidirectional. That is~ it provides us with an intrinsic, observer -
independent difference between the process and its reverse, between 
one direction and its opposite. The existence of such a property would 
render the world temporally anisotropic since~ as was stated in Ch. I~ 
it would allow us to determine an intrinsic difference in direction, 
i.e. , a static directional difference, between the temporal ordering 
relation "earlier than" and its converse. We could then account for 
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temporal asymmetry in terms of this deep and all-pervasive physical 
fixture of the universe. This is, basically, what Eddington attempted 
to do. However, before we evaluate Eddington's attempt to explain time, 
we must discuss the important change brought about in the theory of 
thermodynamics by Boltzmann. To state it briefly, Boltzmann put an 
end to the absoluteness of the second law of thermodynamics. He found 
that the principle of the increase of entropy was not in fact a strict 
but a statistical law. According to Boltzmann we can no longer say 
"entropy will always increase" but only "it is highly probable that 
entropy will increase." Decrease of entropy, moving in the direction 
of greater order, is no longer an impossibility but an improbability, 
although a very strong one. 
4. 2. The Boltzmann statistical interpretation 
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, it was 
realized by Maxwell, Boltzmann, and others that the extreme simplicity 
of the experimental behaviour of gases implied an extreme simplicity 
in the structure of gases on a molecular scale. Only by making a very 
simple picture of an ideal gas can one expect to derive such very simple 
laws. This picture and the derivations of the experimental laws from 
it constitute the subject matter of the kinetic theory of gases. 
In order to derive results that are consistent with the fact 
that the specific thermal energy of a gas depends on temperature alone, 
it is necessary to assume that the molecules of a gas are essentially 
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free particles, that is, that most of the time they are acted on by 
no forces . They do, however, make collisions with each other and with 
the walls of the containers, and during these collisions very large 
forces act to change the directions of the molecular motion. Between 
collisions the molecules move in straight lines in random directions 
at very high speeds . The pressure of the gas on the walls of the 
container arises from the collisions of the molecules with the walls. 
In the earlier development of the kinetic theory probabilistic law has 
already been applied by Maxwell to the arrangements of molecules. The 
actual veloci tes of molecules might be calculated by starting with the 
supposition that all had the same speed but a random distribution of 
directions. A short interval later some collisions would take place, 
the results of which could be calculated by the ordinary methods of 
mechanics. After another short interval more collisions would take 
place, and again the results could be calculated. Such calculations 
would be long and tedious, but Maxwell was able to work them out using 
statistical means. He found that after enough time had elapsed the 
distributions of speeds in the gas becomes constant. For every 
molecule that was slowed down by a collision another was being 
accelerated. According to his scheme there are practically no 
molecules with zero speed, a maximum number with a certain probable speed, 
and fewer than this with higher speeds. This statistical theory does 
not apply, of course, when the number of molecules involved becomes 
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small. This sort of distribution is frequently encountered and is called 
a Maxwellian distribution. Using the results of the kinetic theory of 
gases, according to which the heat content of a gas consists in the 
irregular mechanical motion of its molecules, Boltzmann showed that 
the collisions of molecules are governed by statistical laws which lead 
to an average equalization of differences in speed. "When a fast molecule 
hits a slow one, it may occasionally happen that the slow one imparts 
some of its speed to the fast one, which then travels even faster. Such 
occurrences are, however, an exception. In the vast majority of cases 
it will lead to an equalization of the speeds of both molecules. Going 
from higher to lower temperatures is then understood as the statistical 
equalization of differences in molecular speed. That entropy increases 
during physical process means, then, that ordered arrangements of 
molecules are changed into unordered ones . The law of the increase of 
entropy is guaranteed by the law of large numbers . The probability W 
of a state is therefore related to the state's entropy by the relation 
S = k. log W 
The law however j s no longer of the type of the strict laws of physics, 
such as the laws of mechanics. In other words, there are possible 
exceptions. But the increase of entropy in every closed system is 
guaranteed because the probability of an unordered state greatly 
exceeds the probability of an ordered state. The direction which 
entropy gives to physical processes is thus a statistical trend rather 
than an absolute direction. Becoming is a transition from ordered 
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states to more and more unordered states, :from improbable to highly 
probable configurations of molecules. Boltzmann's H--theorem, that 
the entropy source strength Cl!- is equal to or greater than Zero, 
expresses the fact that the entropy in a closed system can only increase 
in the course of time and, in fact, must approach a limit as the time t 
tends to infinity. The direction of physical processes, and thus the 
direction of time, is thus explained as a statistical trend and the law 
expressing this is a probabilistic rather than a strict or nomological 
implication. If the probability is extremely high one might easily 
mistake a probability law for a strict law. This, then, was Boltzmann's 
contribution to thermodynamics, to show that the strict phenomenological 
second law of entropy increase, formulated by Clausius was, in fact, a 
probabilistic or statistical law. It was on the basis of these results 
that Eddington formulated and developed his theory of the direction of 
time, of "time's arrow". 
4. 3. Eddington and Time's Arrow 
Any change occurring to a body which can be treated as a 
single unit can be undone . The laws of nature admit of the undoing as 
easily as the doing. Such laws controlling the behaviour of single 
individuals Eddington calls primary laws. A sequence of states running 
:from past to future is the doing of an event and the sarre sequence 
running :from future to past is the undoing of the event . The earth, 
in its orbit around the sun is controlled by certain laws of motion 
and gravitation. But there is nothing in these laws of planetary 
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motion which would prevent the earth from moving in the opposite direction. 
The laws of' motion and gravitation are indif'f'erent as to the direction, 
they do not distinguish between the doing and the undoing. So the 
primary laws of' nature are indif'f'erent as to the direction of' time from 
past to future. There is no more distinction between past and future 
than between lef't and right. Such laws describe processes which are 
reversible and provide us with no intrinsic basis f'or our distinction 
between earlier and later, i.e. they are covariant under time reversal. 
The nomological approach to the reduction of' temporal order would 
necessarily f'ail if' all natural laws turned out to possess this covariance. 
"There is only one law of' nature--the second law of' 
thermodynamics--which recognizes a distinction between past 
and future more profound than the difference of' plus and minus . 
It stands aloof f'rom all the rest. But this law has no 
application to the behaviour of' a single individual, and, as 
we shall see later, its subject matter is the random element 
in a crowd. "1 
Thermodynamics is the study of' organization and, f'or Eddington, it is in 
connection with organization that a direction of' time and a distinction 
between doing and undoing appears f'or the f'irst time. There is a 
distinction because, if' the event is a thermodynamical rather than a 
mechanical one, that which is done can never be undone. ''Whenever 
anything happens which cannot be undone, it is always reducible to the 
introduction of' a random element analogous to that introduced by 
shuf'f'ling". 2 Of' course, since the law is a statistical one, it is not 
~dd.ington, A.S. Nature of' the Physical World, Carribridge: 
University Press, 1929, p. 66. 
2Ibid., p. 68. 
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impossible that the original order should, by some chance, return, 
but it is very highly improbable and "This kind of contingency can be 
disregarded". 3 Space does not have this one-way property. Nature is 
indifferent to the interchanging of left and right and a "looking-glassed" 
space continues to make sense whereas a "looking glassed" time becomes 
a "nonsensical farce." Eddington uses the phrase "time's arrow" to 
express this irreversible directional property of time. Of time's arrow 
he says, 
"we Im.lS t note that 
(1) it is vividly recognized by consciousness. 
(2) it is equally insisted on by our reasoning faculty, 
which tells us that a reversal of the arrow would 
render the external world nonsensical. 
(3) it makes no appearance in physical science except in 
the study of organization of a number of individuals. 
Here the arrow indicates the dir~ction of progressive 
increase of the random element." 
Without any appeal to consciousness it is possible to establish 
scientifically an intrinsic direction of time by a study of organization, 
i.e. by a study of the increase of the random element in the universe. 
And the introduction of randomness is the only thing which cannot be 
undone. 
The certainty of the second law is the certainty of large 
numbers. When the gas of the previous example has moved from one 
3Ibid., p. 64. 
4Thid., p. 69. 
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compartment into the other, disorganization has increased. 'Ihere is 
a possibility, strictly speaking, that the molecules of gas may return 
to the one half of the container where they were held previously but 
this is a chance which can be ignored. 'Ihe chance is absurd as a 
practical contingency, but it is precise as a measure. 'Ihe measure 
of this random element is entropy and the law which says that entropy 
must always increase holds "the supreme position a:rrong the laws of 
nature". 5 'Ihe laws which forbid the impossible are the primary laws, 
those which forbid the too improbable are secondary. 'Ihe second law 
of thermodynamics is a secondary law. Time loses its arrow only when 
complete thermodynamical equilibrium has been reached. Time still 
exists but it has no direction since nothing else can give time a 
direction when entropy fails to distinguish one. "So far as physics 
is concerned time ' s arrow is a property of entropy alone . "5a 
But even a statistically defined entropy has failed to 
provide time with an arrow and very serious objections can be made 
against Eddington's analysis. 'Ihe transition from causal to prob-
abilistic laws has had no effect on the problem of time. 'Ihe prob-
abilistic laws for a probabilistically redefined entropy will also be 
shown to be covariant under time reversal in spite of the fact that 
the predictive value of the original phenomonological principle can be 
retained completely. We must return to the work of Boltzmann and the 
5Ibid.' p. 74. 
Saibid., p. 76. 
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problem of reversibility. 
4.4. The Reversibility Objection 
The difficulty to be discussed now concerns the quest~on 
whether it is true that changes toward states of higher entropy, or of 
higher probability, are more probable than changes in the oppos~ te 
direction. In his "Gastheorie" Boltzmann was especially concer.1ed with 
the question, why it is possible to describe the behaviour of ~st 
all physical systems by considering only equilibrium situations. He 
had introduced his famous H-theorem in order to show that any 
non-equilibrium situation would develop in such a way that it ~uld 
approach an equilibrium situation. The answer to the question 'las, 
in this case, that the equilibrium situation is the most probable 
situation, that is, the most probable situation compatible witt a few 
restricting conditions. Previous work in the kinetic gas theorJ had 
already brought a certain amount of agreement in the evaluatior.of 
probability methods in the explanation of aerodynamic processeE on the 
basis of two fundamental groups of hypotheses. These hypotheses were 
(1) Mechanical-structural hypotheses: Every gas quantity is 
a mechanical system consisting of an enormous nurrber of 
similarly structured molecules. 
( 2) So-called probability hypothesis: lawlike behaviour ca"'l 
be attributed to the inestimably complicated movements of 
molecules in the form of statements about the relative 
frequency of different configurations and movements of thE 
molecules. 
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Boltzmann arrived at the conclusion that these hypotheses, as used 
by Maxwell and Clausius, were sufficient to deliver a comprehensive 
explanation of the irreversibility of' processes, i.e. a kinetic 
explanation of the increase of entropy with increase of time. 
T. Loschmidt (1867) and later other authors, among them especially 
E. Zermelo (1896), brought objections against the Boltzmann result 
which could be summarized in the following statement: It follows from 
the most basic assumptions of the kinetic theory of' gases that an equally 
large increase or decrease of entropy are further justified. Loschmidt 's 
"reversibility paradox" showed that f'or each system which shows a steady 
increase of entropy we can construct a system f'or which entropy is 
steadily decreasing. Another difficulty was pointed out by Zermelo 
who used a theorem of Poincare's. Poincare had shown that if a sys tern 
enclosed in a finite volume passes through the sequence from t, to 
t , say, this sequence will be repeated as accurately as we wish it 
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to be repeated after a finite time interval. This paradox is called 
the recurrence paradox. The reversibility and recurrence paradoxes 
invalidate the H-theorem in its unrestricted form, that is, the 
statement that entropy must always increase. It stands to reason that 
the second principle of' thermodynamics, committed as it is to the 
irreversibility of processes, could not make a consistent adjustment 
to statistical mechanics derivable from Newton's reversible laws of' 
motion except by severely restricting or abandoning the claim that 
irreversible processes occur in nature. The difficulty arises not 
only from the nature of mechanical processes but also from the nature 
46 
of' probability methods as such. 'Ihe elementary processes of' statistical 
thermodynamics> the motion and collisions of' molecules> are described 
and predicted by the laws of' Newtonian mechanics and are there:fore 
reversible. AssliDl.e we have an insulated container with two compart-
ments separated by a removable partition. One compartment is :filled 
with gas and the other is empty. If' we now remove the partition the 
molecules of' gas :flow into the empty compartment> all moving in an 
orderly :fashion in the same direction> say +d. 'Ihe molecules then 
collide with walls of' the second compartment and are re:flected in a 
disorderly f'ashion. Entropy> the measure of' disorganization> has 
increased. But> in Boltzmarm' s gas theory> the probability that a 
molecule will have a certain velocity is independent of' the sign of' that 
velocity. If' the velocity of' the molecules moving in direction +d is 
+v> then> according to this> the reverse velocity> -- v in direction 
-d> is equally probable. But the movement of' the molecules in direction 
-d would mean a return of' the molecules to the original compartment. 
But this is a highly ordered arrangement and entropy has decreased. 
'Ihis is not a description of' a very likely occurrence but it means 
that> according to the basic assumptions of' the mechanics of' reversible 
processes> such a state may occur as a natural result of' many collisions 
and that> in fact> the occurrence of' such a state has a de:finite 
probability. In the long run> it can be shown that such processes 
occur with the same probability as their reverse> i.e. over a 
suf:ficiently long period of time processes in which entropy decreases 
occur as o:ften as processes in which entropy increases. 'Ihis is also 
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a necessary result of the nature of objective probability as such. 
Every state which has a non-zero probability must occur with that 
non-zero frequency. Given a closed system which begins to develop 
from an ordered state, like the gas in the previous example, the 
initial state has a low entropy. The entropy will then increase until 
it reaches a state of equilibrium. The entropy may then retain a high 
value for a long period of time but there will be fluctuations . But 
will the system ever return to a state of order similar to its initial 
state? According to probability theory, since the initial ordered 
state had a definite positive probability value this ordered state 
must eventually recur. In fact, each point on the initial curve 
representing the initial entropy increase represents a state of the 
system with an ever increasing positive probability value. States 
represented by points close to the peak of the initial curve will 
occur more often, i.e. minor fluctuations will occur more often than 
major ones, but since the highly ordered state represented by the 
bottom of the curve has a positive value, it too must eventually 
occur, i.e • there will eventually be rnaj or fluctuations . The curve 
for such a closed system could be represented by the following graph: 
8 c 
0 
probability. 
1 
entropy. 
A--------initial ordered-
state. 
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- --t) time 
fig. 2. 
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The curve will stay at h_igh values most of the time and, looking at 
the curve, we see that every increase of entropy, excluding the 
initial one, is preceded by a corresponding decrease and for a curve 
of inf'ini te length there are as many increases as decreases. Therefore 
transitions to lower entropy are as frequent as transitions to higher 
entropy. This is the reversibility objection. Its relevance to the 
problem of finding a physical criterion for time-order is obvious. 
Assuming the universe to be spatially finite, the curve in 
fig. 2. could also be the curve for entropy increase in the universe. 
Any point on the curve would represent an 11instantaneous state" of 
the universe, a temporal cross-section through the four-dimensional 
space-tinE world. This means that the curve would also have to extend 
to the left of A, rising to a point of high entropy, and continuing to 
the left in rru.ch the sa:rre fashion as the curve ABC ... 0 does to the right . 
Now increases and decreases occur equally often on the curve and 
therefore the curve does not possess a unique direction. Given any 
point P on the curve and if Q represents a state separated from P by 
a sufficiently long time period, i.e. if Q is temporally later than P, 
then it is more probable that the entropy of Q is higher than the entropy 
of P than vice versa since the curve stays in upper levels much longer 
than in lower levels. But if Q precedes P in time the same result 
follows since it does not make any difference when we move to the left 
or to the right on the curve. So, given two states P and W, such that 
the entropy of Q is higher than the entropy of P, we cannot decide, on 
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this basis alone, which of the two states is the earlier one and which 
the later one. Thus the entropy curve does not provide us with a criterion 
for distinguishing between earlier and later, since the statistical entropy 
direction of the universe is not unique. The probabilistic laws concerning 
the variations of a probabilistically defined entropy are thus found to be 
covariant under time reversal. So entropy increase in closed systems has 
lost its ability to indicate "time's arrow" in Eddington's sense. In 
spite of the failure of Eddington's attempt many authors have made 
different attempts to derive from the second law of thermodynamics a 
criterion for the anisotropy of time, while at the same time accepting 
the consequences of the analysis given above. Reichenbach's posthumously 
published book "The Direction of Time" is one such attempt, which we 
shall now consider. 
4.5. The Reichenbach Solution 
The reason why the entropy curve just considered, and with it 
the reversibility objection, fail to provide us with a criterion for 
anisotropy is be cause it is the curve of a "time ensemble", i . e . , it 
pertains to the "history of one system", in this case the system being 
the universe. Reichenbach abandons the time ensemble and turns to the 
study of a Hspace ensemblef! which not only provides better results but 
is closer to "the actual procedure which is used when inferences 
concerning time direction are made". Whereas the time-ensemble is a 
single system, a space ensemble is a collection of isolated subsystems 
which have branched off from the main system and continue for a limited 
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or unlimited time in relative isolation from the main system. Such 
subsystems are a natural product or occur through the intervention of 
man and, from a highly ordered beginning, re:rrJCI.in isolated and run through 
an evolution toward disorder. 
"Nature abounds in branch systems of' this kind, i.e. 
systems that branch off' :from the comprehensive system and 
remain isolated from then on :for some length of time. Their 
evolution begins with an ordered state, that is, a state of 
relatively low entropy, and progresses toward disorder, that 
is, toward relatively high entropy. We use the word "relatively" 
here to indicate that this entropy is ref'erred to the sub-system, 
not to the universe or the main system. These are the observa-
tional facts to which the statistical definition of time dir-
ection must be ref' erred. When we infer from the inequality, 
sB> S , that, in all probability, A was earlier than B, this 
probab!lity is of a diff'erence kind :from the one discussed in 
connection with the reversibility objection; it ref'ers, not 
to the sequence of states of' the isolated system to which the 
states A and B belong, but to the series of similar systems, 
conceived of as an ensemble of' branch systems. That is, ~t 
ref'ers, not to a time ensemble, but to a space ensemble." 
We thus find systems with highly ordered initial states (e.g. an ice 
cube :floating in a glass of hot water) which progress towards disordered 
states (e.g. a glass of tepid water). Now, consider a whole ensemble of 
such systems, the world lines of which are symbolized by a probability 
lattice, whose Y denotes an event in the history of' the system. 
Yla Ylb Ylc Yld Yli 
Y2a Y2b Y2c Y2d Y2i 
Yka Ykb Ykc Ykd .•••. Yki 
6Reichenbach, H. , The Direction of Time, op. cit . p. 118. 
51 
The first element Yka of a row is in a highly ordered state. In the 
succeeding states the order gradually disappears until a state of 
disorder is reached. Each row represents a system. The development in 
any one system can give us no indication of a unique direction since, 
if the time element t is sufficiently large, there will be an equal 
number of increases and decreases and therefore no unique direction. 
The probability of a system, of a horizontal row, is called by Reichenbach 
a "one-system probability", in conjunction with which he develops what 
he calls a vertical probability or a many-system-probability. In the 
latter type of probability we are dealing with the statistics of an 
ensemble of branch systems rather than with the evolution of a single 
system. Now consider a vertical or sectional state ~ of the whole 
ensemble, which is followed by a state Bk. Reichenbach sets out to 
prove that in the overwhelming majority of cases the entropy of ~ is 
less than that of ~ if and only if ~ is earlier than ~. We can say 
this because we are considering an ensemble of branch systems which, in 
a state of relatively high order, have broken off from the main system. 
Reichenbach can now give the definition; the direction in which most 
thermodynamical processes in isolated systems occur is the direction of 
positive time. The various branch systems have entropy curves which 
break off from the main entropy curve of the universe and return to it. 
The direction from earlier to later is given by the fact that the total 
entropy curve of the universe is on the upgrade. After aeons of time 
it might be on the downgrade, and if there were living creatures then 
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their direction from earlier to later would be opposite to ours. It 
follows that a time direction can be defined only for sections of the 
total entropy curve. "Only certain sections of time have directions~ 
and these directions are not the same". 7 It is only through its 
reiteration in branch systems that the entropy growth of the universe 
dictates to us a direction of time. 'Ihe universal increase of entropy 
is reflected in the behaviour of branch systems and only their reflection 
of the general trend in many individual manifestations is visible to us 
and appears to us as the direction of time. 
The statistical definition of time direction is based on 
five assumptions which Reichenbach regards as empirical hypotheses 
which are convincingly verified. These assumptions are 
Ass. 1. The entropy of the universe is at present low 
and is situated on a slope of the entropy curve. 
Ass. 2. There are many branch systems~ which are isolated 
from the main system for a certain period~ but which are 
connected with the main system at their two ends. 
Ass. 3. 'Ihe lattice of branch systems is a lattice of 
mixture. 
Ass. 4. In the vast majority of branch systems~ one end 
is a low point~ the other a high point. 
Ass. 5. In the vast majority of branch systems~ the direc-
tions toward higher entropy are parallel to one another and 
7 Ibid. ~ p . 127 . 
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to that of' the ma.in system. 
11In order to derive the direction properties of time~ we have to add 
the factual assumptions 1 - 5." On the basis of these empirical 
assumptions and by means of a rigorous mathematical treatment Reichenbach 
therefore claims to have given a physical definition of time order in 
terms of entropy which avoids the reversibility objection that the 
Eddington attempt could not overcome. 
4.6. Criticism of the Reichenbach Solution 
In view of the fact that the reductionist thesis attempts to 
give an empirical definition of temporal order in terms of observable 
features of the world as these are expressed in scientific laws it is 
paradoxical that this apparently rigid empirical reduction should depend 
on certain assumptions about the cosmos which~ in the present state of' 
cosmology~ could hardly be unreservedly accepted as reliable. In 
particular one would have reservations about his assumption that the 
entropy is defined for the entire universe~ such that the universe 
as a whole can be assumed to exhibit the same sort of' statistical 
entropy curve as defined f'or a permanently closed finite system. 
Similar considerations apply to the assumption that the direction of 
entropy increase for the entire universe parallels that of the entropy 
increase in the ma.j ori ty of sys terns of' a space ensemble. In a 
singularly non-empirical manner Reichenbach also concludes that~ 
cosmically, the statistical anisotropy of time fluctuates, i.e. that 
the alternations of' epochs of entropy increase and decrease in the 
universe go hand in hand with the alternations of the direction of 
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entropy increase of the ensembles of branch systems associated with 
there respective epochs. If the thermodynamical definition of time 
order depends on such far-reaching assumption about the cosmosat large 
then this is a very high price to pay for a co-ordinative definition. 
Another objection to the Reichenbach definition is that it 
is not based on some pervasive feature of the physical universe but 
rather on certain isolated and limited systems, and it may be very 
arbitrary what we are willing to call, at any time, a branch system. 
The definition in terms of branch-systems also represents 
a come-down from Reichenbach's original plan to find the solution to 
the problem of time "in the laws and equations of mathematical physics." 
For the statistical definition of time order depends not only on the 
statistical laws of entropy increase but also on certain complicated 
de facto nomologically contingent boundary conditions, namely, the 
de facto properties of branch systems. 
The branch-hypotheses, on which Reichenbach's definition is 
based, I would consider to be gratuitous and I would say that his 
attempt to establish temporal anisotropy on the basis of conventional 
thermodynamics in conjunction with other independent and gratuitous 
assumptions has failed. This elaborate construction of rigid prob-
abilistic laws and non-rigid cosmological assumptions can not present 
us, in any convincing way, with the scientific counterpart of the 
temporal order we know from experience and it has certainly not proven 
the disp61Sibility of the temporal knowledge in the scientific context. 
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Chapter Five 
TIME, LAW AND EXPERIENCE 
5 .1. Time as experience and scientific time 
lt was the reductionist's conviction that the solution to the 
problem of time lay in the laws and equations of mathematical physics. 
The time of experience, or intuitive time, was to be reduced to some 
physical order such that, in the scientific context, there would be 
no reliance on this time of experience. Thus time of experience or 
subjective time was to be given its' real meaning and content by 
physical time, or time of scientific theory which was, in turn, 
reducible to some other physical order. 
"It has often been claimed that only the physical 
properties of time can be revealed in such an investigation 
and that, unaffected by physical time, the psychological 
experience of time retains its' a priori character and 
obeys its' own laws. This view which has been expressed 
by various philosophical writers in connection with the 
theory of relativity, must be rejected most emphatically ..... . 
We shall therefore use the distinction between time as 
experience and physical time only as a temporary aid which 
leads us to a deeper scientific insight into the concept 
of time; we shall correct the intuitive experience time 
accordingly ...... This analysis will clarify the meaning 
and content of everyday experiences; finally we shall learn 
in this way, better than through a phenomenological analysis, 
what we actually mean by the experience of time."l 
The thesis which I wish to maintain in this chapter may be divided 
1Reichenbach, H., The Philosophy of Space and Time, op. cit. 
p. 113. 
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into two parts: 
(l) The relation between subjective time or time of experience 
and physical or scientific-theoretic time is not such that 
the former must be reducible to or explained in terms of 
the latter, and the reductionist attempt is based on a 
misunderstanding of the nature and status of scientific-
theoretic concepts in relation to the concepts of experience. 
(2) The time of scientific theory of physical time can be 
rendered asymmetrical or unidirectional only by presupposing 
certain basic assumptions about the time of experience. 
Physical theory need not confine itself to the use of directly observable 
or experienced entities but uses also "theoretical constructs", or what 
Quine calls "cultural posits". 2 The totality of scientific knowledge is, 
according to this view, a man-made fabric which impinges on experience 
only along the edges. Speculative constructs may be introduced freely 
into scientific theory provided it can be shown what connection these 
constructs have with observation. Such constructs are not, however, 
necessarily defined in terms of observations and the chains connecting 
them may be long and involved. 
"Objects at the atomic level are posited to make the 
laws of macroscopic objects, and ultimately the laws of 
experience, simpler and more manageable; and we need not 
expect or demand full definition of atomic and subatomic 
entities in terms of macroscopic ones, any more than 
definitions of macroscopic things in terms of sense data. "3 
2Quine, W. From a logical point of view, New York: 
Harper and Row, 1963, p. 44-5. 
3Quin e, W. .<::£. cit . , p . 44-5 . 
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The theoretical constructs become valid when the scientific theory of 
which they are a part becomes an efficacious device for the prediction 
of future experience or for working a manageable structure into the 
flux of experience. 
One meets very often terms which, as q result of the nature 
of scientific theorizing, seem to have, as it w~re, a double meaning. We 
have, on the one hand, the "force" of our every(,iay experience, muscular 
exertion, pushes and pulls; on the other hand the "force" of scientific 
theory, force as it occurs in such contexts as ''field of force" or 
"f =rna". One is not defineable in terms of the other nor is one 
reducible to the other. To call one subjective and the other objective 
is not to refer to their degree of objectivity but to the fact that 
one refers to the plane of experience, the other to the plane of 
theoretic construction. Similarly we have, on the one hand, the time 
of experience and, on the other hand, the time of scientific theory. 
The first is the time of temporal awareness, or immediate experience. 
The second is a theoretical construct which occurs in many scientific 
laws and equations and which is in no way bound to reflect or reproduce 
any or all of the properties of the time of experience. For instance, 
whereas the time of experience is unidirectional, moving from past to 
fUture, it is quite acceptable in scientific theory to speak of a time 
variable which moves in the opposite direction, from future to past. 
This does not mean that we would have to correct or change our concept 
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of time of experience. Scientific time is not the "true" or "real" 
time any more than scientific force is the "true" force. It's just 
that one is a concept from our immediate experience and the other is 
a theoretical concept or construct related to our experience in quite 
a different way. 
Physical or scientific time does not have a privileged status 
from which we could "correct" time as experienced or show what time as 
experience "actually means". To attempt this is to misunderstand the 
nature of both concepts. Reductionism is based on a hierarchial con-
ceptualization of science in which the notion of "presupposes" is 
asymmetrical. If A presupposes B then it cannot be the case that B 
presupposes A. In this hierarchial conceptualization scientific theories 
are ordered verically or in pyramid-fashion where each level in the 
hierarchy presupposes~ in some sense~ the level or levels below it~ but 
not vice versa. 
"In order to analyze the contents of cognitions, 
epistemology must investigate the objects (concepts) of 
~mpirical) science in its various subdivisions (natural and 
cultural sciences). It must ascertain to which other objects 
the cognition of any given object may be "reduced". Hence~ an 
11analysis" of objects is undertaken when the 11higher" objects 
are reduced to "lower" ones. Those objects which can no longer 4 be reduced are called "(epistemologicall y) fundamental" objects". 
11If the investigations whose results are here sketched are 
actually carried out (this is the task of construction theory), one 
4carnap, R. Logical Structure of t he World, Pseudo Problems 
in Philosophy~ Berkeley: University of California Press~ 1967, p. 305-6. 
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is led to the following stratified epistemological system of the four 
most important object-types (to be read from bottom to top): 
4. Cultural objects. 
3. Heteropsychological objects. 
2. Physical objects. 
1. Autopsychological objects. 
The objects within each of these levels can in turn also be 
organized according to their epistemological reducibility. The final 
result is a system of scientific objects or concepts which, from a few 
"basic concepts", leads in a step-by-step construction to all the 
remaining concepts. In this system each concept which can become the 
object of a scientific statement has a definite place. The organization 
of concepts in this system has a two-fold significance. To begin with, 
each concept is epistemologically secondary relative to the concepts 
which stand below it. Furthermore, each concept can be defined, that 
is, a definite description of it can be given by referring only to the 
concepts which stand below it."5 
Whether the "fundamental objects" (concepts) be sense data, 
physical objects, simple experiences or even elementary logical or 
mathematical deductions, the basic view of science remains the same; it 
is hierarchical, it has "foundations", and "presupposing" or reducing" 
is unidirectional. I would suggest an alternative conceptualization in 
which there are no absolutely "fundamental objects (concepts) 11 , no 
5Ibid., p. 321-22. 
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absolute "foundations" and in which the decision as to what is to be 
presupposed or accepted will depend on the particular problem under 
consideration and the particular type of experimental design that can 
be devised to cope with it. The conceptual model suggested on pages 56 
and 57 could be represented by a sphere, the center of which is 
occupied by pure or highest-level theoretic terms, such terms as play 
a central role in scientific theories and are farthest removed from 
experience, (e.g. force, energy, matter). Moving out from the center 
are many levels of theory until, at the rough edge of the sphere we 
have the level of experience or observation. In the hierarchical or 
reductionist conceptualization all concepts in the sphere must be 
cashed out in terms of the observational periphery, and each concept 
occupies a definite level. In the alternative conceptualization which 
I have suggested not only are the theoretic concepts not necessarily 
defined in terms of observations but no concept has a well defined or 
unique level. The sphere is not a static but a dynamic model and the 
relative positions of concepts or theories represented by it will depend 
on the nature or des.ign of some particular scientific endeavour. "What, 
in one experimental design, may be regarded as incontrovertable data 
nay, in another related or unrelated endeavour be regarded as a highly 
theoretic construction. The symmetry of the presuppositional relation 
also makes it possible for concepts or theories to presuppose one 
another in a circular but experimentally meaningful way for their mutual 
advancement. 
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In the remainder of' this chapter I will try to show that 
the problem of' irreversibility connected with the second law of' 
thermodynamics can be best resolved by making certain assumptions about 
the nature of' time. 
5. 2. Subjective time and it's physical counterpart 
We recall that the original problem was to f'ind a co-ordinative 
definition of' temporal order and we interpreted this as the search f'or 
some physical feature of' the total states of' world, expressed in known 
natural laws, which would define a dyadic relation between every pair 
of states such that the class of states forms a serial order with respect 
to this relation. We can order the events of our experience temporally 
but in doing so we rely on our own subjective sense of time order. A 
co-ordinative definition, as understood by Reichenbach, would enable us 
to determine, for any two events, without dependence on our subjective 
impressions, which one was earlier than the other. In other words, the 
co-ordinative definition of' time order could not depend on any assumptions 
about the nature of time or on any prior knowledge of temporal order 
derived f'rom our own (subjective) experience. Such a definition would 
eliminate the need for any recourse to the time of our experience in the 
scientific context. Time order is, in this very strong sense, reduced 
to this other order, e.g. the order of' events in a causal chain, or the 
order of states of a system increasing in entropy. llie causal or the 
entropic order would then be a physical counterpart to the temporal order. 
But there is also another sense in which we can speak of a physical 
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counterpart to time order. Accepting the time order of our experience 
as valid we could look for some feature of the physical world which 
would reflect or give content to our experience of time order. Time 
order would not thereby be reduced to this physical feature but would 
remain an independent aspect of our experience. But the indication of 
structural similarities between both orders would enable us_, in a real 
sense_, to speak of a physical counterpart to the temporal order of an 
experience. I shall attempt to show in this chapter that_, by accepting 
as valid certain basic assumptions about the time of our experience_, we 
can indeed find in the statistical second law of thermodynamics_, that 
physical feature of the world which gives clear expression to the temporal 
structure we know in our experience. 
5.3. 'Ihe elimination of subjective time in science 
The elimination of the recourse to experienced time was_, as 
we saw_, one of the main aims of the reductionist thesis. 'Ihis was not 
successfully accomplished in the causal theory because the specification 
of an asymmetric causal relation by means of the mark-method was open 
to the charge that either it made tacit use of prior temporal knowledge 
or that it had to assume an irreversible marking process. The attempt 
by Eddington to derive the temporal order from the statistical second 
law of thermodynamics failed because_, as was shown_, the H-theorem was 
time-symmetrical. According to the H-theorem we can define an entropy 
and know that a closed system_, whose entropy value at a certain point 
in time is not its highest possible one_, will_, with very high probability 
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have a greater entropy value at another point in time. But the H-theorem 
cannot define a direction in time and this is obvious from its derivation. 
For the proof of the H-theorem presupposes, apart from the concept of 
thermodynamic probability, only the law of mechanics which, as we have 
seen, are completely symmetrical, i.e. they do not change in a reversal 
of time direction. The mathematical basis for the H-theorem is, according 
to Boltzmann, the extraordinary growth of statistical probability as 
entropy approaches maximum value. A given state possessing a non-maxium 
entropy value has therefore, let us say, a greater choice of states with 
greater entropy value than of states with smaller entropy value. One 
can conclude, therefore, that, with great probability, the entropy value 
of the system at a later time will be greater. But with the same prob-
ability one can conclude that the entropy value of the system at an 
earlier point in time was greater. This contradicts the second law of 
thermodynamics since this law states that, also for the past, every 
entropy value of a closed system was preceded by a smaller or at least 
equal entropy value./So the second law does not follow directly from 
the H-theorem and from the H-theorem alone one could not derive an 
asymmetric time order. The H-theorem is compatible with the second 
law if the H-theorem could be used only to calculate the future but 
never the past entropy values of a system. This is, in a sense, what 
Reichenbach has achieved with his branch-system hypothesis. In most 
branch systems in a space-ensemble, each of which is initially in a 
state of low entropy, the entropy will be higher after a given time t, 
but not before, since the branch systems did not exist as distinct 
64 
systems prior to the occurrence of their initial branching off states. 
Therefore these systems do not also exhibit the same higher entropy 
states at earlier times as they would have had they always existed as 
closed systems. Thus the space ensembles of branch systems do not 
reproduce the entropic time symmetry of a single closed system. Thus 
the H-theorem plus branch hypothesis should deliver the required asymmetry. 
But~ as we have seen~ there is very little real reason for accepting the 
very general cosmological assumptions on which the branch-hypothesis is 
based. Another problem with the branch-hypothesis is that it requires 
reference to observed systems which branch off from the main system at 
earlier times and if this observational criterion is meant to involve 
man's subjective time sense~ it is not very clear how Reichenbach could 
justify having recourse to it. All those attempts therefore to dispense 
with recourse to the time of experience have met with insurmountable 
difficulties. Thereis~ however, in the Reichenbachian-branch-hypothesis 
a very important kernel of truth~ the implications of which we will 
attempt to show in the section that follows. 
5. 4. The past and future of experience 
In Reichenbach's account the H-theorem is used only to calculate 
the future but never the past entropy values of a system. The reason 
for this is that the branch system did not exist prior to their 
branching-off state and therefore we can know the path of its origin 
and, with sufficient precision, the curve of its entropy values from 
its initial branching-off state to the present. Probability methods 
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are not used to determine its initial state or its history to the 
present since these are, in fact, known. What is not known is its 
future entropy curve and, in this case, probability methods are necessary 
and appropriate. A probabalistically defined entropy thus becomes 
unidirectional by means of being applied only to future unknown states 
of a system and not to past states which are already known. 
In all experiments in which the H-theorem is used to calculate 
the entropy value of a state, it is used only to calculate the entropy 
value of future states. Probability methods are not used to calculate 
values concerning the part of the system in question, since this is already 
known. In fact, every experiment concerning which the second law of 
thermodynamics offers a prediction, begins with a state to which the 
object of the experiment as a closed system would never have come on its 
own, e.g. experiments with heat engines with temperature difference, 
diffusion with a spatial separation of substances as in the gas example 
used previously. The initial state is usually produced artifically, 
directly or indirectly, and is thus known along with the entropic curve 
to the begirming of the system. The future entropy change is unknown 
and, for their prediction, the probability arguments of the H-theorem 
are appropriate. 
But the second law of thermodynamics goes much further when 
it states that, for that part of the past which is known neither through 
the memory of the individual physicist nor through the documents of 
tradition, the entropy value of earlier states was lower than that of 
later states. The second law could then be derived only by making . the 
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following assumption about the universe: - that part of the world known 
to us was at one time in a very improbable state. 
"In as much as we can regard this part of the world as 
a closed system the increase of entropy for later time 
follows directly."6 
Although the content of this assumption may be acceptable its' foundation 
is a problem. This statement by Boltzmann is problematic because it 
characterizes this state of the universe as extremely improbable and we 
are then led to the question--how is it that such an improbable state 
could be realized since the whole statistical foundation of thermodynamics 
rests on the assumption that with practical certainty only the most 
probable will always happen? If this question is not appropriate then 
it could only be because we need a characterization of the past which 
does not include the concept of thermodynamical probability as a 
basic concept. In other words, also for that part of the history of the 
world beyond the reach of experiment the application of probability 
methods is inappropriate . 
We have come to the conclusion that the probabalistic arguments 
of the H-theorem are appropriately applied to the calculation of the 
entropy value of future states of a system and not of past states. For 
the derivation of the second law of thermodynamics and its temporal 
asyrmnetry we are therefore led to make the following assumption: At 
every moment the past is a completed fact to be regarded as basically 
something finished and known; the future however has not yet happened 
6 Boltzmann, L. Vorlesungen u.ber Gastheorie, Bd. II, Leipzig, 
1895. p. 280. 
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and is undetermined and can therefore be predicted by probabilistic 
methods with the degree of certainty appropriate to such methods. From 
this follows, in conjunction with the H-theorem, the increase of entropy 
for the future. However, every past moment was a present. From this 
follows the increase of entropy for all those times which were then 
future, i.e. for all that time which at present is past. 
This assumption concerning the difference between past and 
future (or some similar assumption) allows us to restrict the applicability 
of the H-theorem to future states of a system and this restriction allows 
us to find in the entropy curve of such a system the desired temporal 
asymmetry. We can thus see, in the entropic order, a physical counterpart 
to the temporal order of our experience. 
This does not mean that the above assumption is ultimate in 
any sense. The suggested conceptual model would also allow the same 
assumption to be a derived statement in another framework, for instance, 
a framework in which man's own body participates in the entropic lawfulness 
of branch systems in the sense that man's memory, just as much as all 
purely physical recording devices, accwnulates "traces" or records, 
the direction of which is dictated by the statistics of branch-systems. 
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